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Preface 
 
 
In April 2005 I started my thesis research at the High Voltage Technology & Management group 
of the TUDelft about maintenance practices in the protective relaying field. The project has been 
initiated by Siemens Nederland N.V. but has been supervised by the TUDelft. During the 10 
months of work on the thesis, Siemens Nederland N.V. supported me by bringing me into contact 
to specialists and engineers. In September Nuon Tecno joined the project. With the participation 
of Nuon Tecno it was possible to obtain more information about applied relaying practices.  
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Introduction 
 
Protective relays in medium voltage grids are used for protection of transformers, cables and 
loads. Protective relays are components used for recognising fault situations. In medium voltage 
grids the most common fault situations are: 
• Overload 
• Short circuit 
 
In some situations it is necessary to disconnect a cable, transformer or a load. A circuit breaker 
disconnects these components as an act on the trip signal of a protective relay.  
 
Medium voltage grids in the Netherlands are mainly protected by over current protective relays. 
Three kinds of protective relays of the over current type represent three generations of 
protection technology.  
• First generation: Electromechanical kind 
• Second generation: Static (analog) kind 
• Third generation: Numerical (digital) kind 
 
The first generation protective relays were commissioned in the late 40s and some of them are 
still in service and still form the majority in the protective relays. The maintenance approach on 
these protective relays hasn’t changed much for years. Though, recently the maintenance on 
protective relays has changed. This shift was caused by: 
• Liberalization of Dutch energy market 
• Changing insights in maintenance on protective relays 
• Skill of maintenance engineers in the protection field 
• No more support of manufacturers on these relays 
• Availability of replacement parts 
 
The changing insights in maintenance on protective relays form the outline of this thesis. System 
operators and also servicing companies are interested in whether the changes can be justified. In 
this thesis an effort was made to: 
• Describe the current relaying practice in Dutch medium voltage grids 
• Analyse the impact of outages caused by failing protective relays 
• Analyze the maintenance process as it has been for years 
• Analyze the maintenance process as it is applied now 
• Review of the current maintenance process by comparison with the old process 
• Formulate recommendations based on the review 
• Describe a proposal for acquiring information from the maintenance process 
 
By application of the Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) technique it was 
possible to make this analysis. The FMECA IEC812 standard forms the basis of the new 
developed FMECA-sheet for protective relays.  
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1   Analysis of current protective relaying practices in Dutch medium 
voltage grids. 
 
1.1. Current protective relaying practice in medium voltage grids. 
To point out about which grids are included in this study, the following definition is adopted for 
medium voltage grids: 
 
“ c. Medium voltage networks: networks intended for transmission of electricity on a voltage 
level of 1kV and above, but lower than 50kV.” 
 
Source:  “Gebiedsindeling” augustus 2003 ,DTE , 1.1 Werkingssfeer en definities sub 1.1.2 
 
Medium voltage networks in the Dutch grid are for a vast majority represented by 10 kV level 
installations. This study is mainly concentrated on 10 kV transportation/distribution networks 
commissioned by Dutch system operators. Private medium voltage installations are discarded from the 
scope of this study. The following picture describes some typical installation setups on the 10kV level: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Typical Medium voltage substation setups 
 
Protective relaying in these setups consists of several types of protection systems. The combination of 
a protective relay and a circuit breaker forms the protection system. Each of these systems takes their 
share in protecting a system component. For example such components are: 
• Transformer 
• Bus bar 
   10 
• Feeder/line 
 
These components need to be protected against the following fault situations: 
• Over current or over voltage:  
Over currents occur during short circuit fault and over voltages occur after a lightning stroke. 
• Duration (overload):  
In case of a line, cable or transformer carries a higher burden than the rated value. 
 
In the Dutch medium voltage grids common types of protection are: 
• over current protection,  
• differential protection 
• distance (zone) protection 
 
In appendix 1 a short explanation of the operating principles of these protection types can be 
found.The following tables give an indication of the magnitude of the Dutch sub 
transmission/distribution grids and presence of protective relays in these grids. 
 
Table 1. Magnitude of the Dutch medium voltage grid 
Dutch medium voltage grid       
        
Voltage levels [kV] :  3, 6, 10, 12.5, 20 and 25    
        
Number of substations: 103177    
        
Grid length [km] :  91930    
      
            
 
Table 1 is a summarized table of the information given in [1]. A more detailed look into [1] shows that 
medium voltage grids are mainly represented by 10 kV level installations. The next table shows gives 
an indication of the presence of protective relays in Dutch medium voltage grids.  
 
Table 2 presence of microprocessor based protective relays 
 Type   Voltage ≤ 50 kV   
  Total 
microprocessor based 
(numerical) Percentage 
Distance 3072 305 9.93% 
Differential (zone) 2353 2 0.08% 
Differential (transformer) 411 24 5.84% 
Bus bar 35 0 0.00% 
Over current 40132 981 2.44% 
Total 46053 1362 2.96% 
 
 
The information is shows what type of protection systems are used in medium voltage grids. Table 2 
also shows that the majority of protective relays are of older kinds1 of protective relays. 
 
Remarks: 1)  In the historical development of protective relays there have been three generations of protective relays. In the 
late 40s the first generation, the electromechanical type, came in to commission. In the early 70s the second 
generation, the electronic or analog type, was introduced as replacement for the first generation. The third 
generation, the numerical or microprocessor based type was introduced short after that. All three kinds of relays 
are still present in the medium voltage networks.  
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1.2. Reliability of protective relays 
[5] Describes the reliability of the Dutch high/medium and low voltage grid. Most disturbances occur 
in medium voltage grids. Common causes for disturbances in the medium voltage grids are: 
 
 
Figure 2 . Causes for disturbances in the medium voltage grid in 2002 
 
Disturbances caused by failing protective relays are not mentioned. 
 
Studies concerning the reliability of protective relays in the Dutch grids and especially the medium 
voltage grids are hardly available. Information about the performance of protection systems is only 
published in confidential company bound reports. [2] Presents results about the reliability of protective 
relays. The following table shows these results: 
 
Table 3 total of protective relays that have failed the past 5 years 
Total of protective relays that have failed in a time frame of 5 years   
  
    total         Kind of failure  of the protective relay 
      
Due to an 
outage  
During 
inspection 
During 
maintenance  Other 
Electromechanical  43  8 (19%) 24 (56%) 11 (26%) 0 (0%) 
Static (analog)  176  16 (9%) 44 (25%) 110 (63%) 6 (3%) 
Numerical 37  6 (16%) 3 (5%) 12 (32%) 17 (46%) 
                  
 
The table shows that failures of electromechanical and static protective relays are mainly determined 
during the maintenance process.  
 
A failure of numerical relay can also be determined by the so-called “live contact”. This feature makes 
it possible to assess the operational status of a protective relay by means of distance monitoring. 
Numerical protective relays have built in self-check functions, which regularly test the functionality of 
the protective relay. The live contact signals in case of a fail of a self-check. This feature is not 
available in electromechanical and (most) types of static relays. For this reason regular checks are 
required. 
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1.3. Efforts in maintaining the reliability of protective relays 
The maintenance process needed to keep the protective relays operative has been a labor-intensive 
process for years. This is typically valid electromechanical protective relays. Electromechanical relays 
were checked in intervals of once per year. These checkups consisted of inspecting visually, testing, 
recalibration and if needed repair and refurbishing to an as new component. Since protective relays 
are mainly idle components in their operational life, regular checks can only give confidence that a 
protective relay will operate when it is supposed to. The later introduced static and numerical 
protective relays didn’t have the need for such intensive maintenance activities. Manufacturers have 
recommended only visually inspecting and testing these relays since no or hardly any serviceable 
parts are present in these relays. Also the intervals of checkups were changed into longer intervals. 
The next table shows the inspection intervals for all three generations: 
 
Table 4. Inspection intervals of protective relays 
Inspection intervals of protective relays     
  yearly 
every 2 
years 
every 3 
years 
every 4 
years 
every 5 
years 
Electromagnetic x 
 
x x    
Static   x    
Numerical    x   
            
 
1.4. Changes and trends in maintenance activities in protective relaying 
The past 10 to 15 years new insights in maintenance activities on protective relays and the recent 
liberalization of the Dutch energy market have forced some changes in the maintenance of protective 
relays. These changes affected the maintenance activities on electromechanical relays especially. One 
major change was the approach in the regular checkups. Electromechanical relays consist of some 
delicate components like moving coils, springs, contacts etc. A checkup in which these components 
are subjected to some invasive actions could damage these parts. Invasive actions are for example 
the burnishing of contacts, adjusting springs and adjustment of other mechanical parts. To carry out a 
more invasive inspection, a criterion has been set. Only in the case of not passing a functional test 
because of faulty or drifted settings, a more invasive inspection is allowed. This approach resulted in a 
gradual loss of skill of maintenance personnel in maintaining electromechanical relays.  
 
Another factor of influence is that the manufacturers stopped the technical support on 
electromechanical protective relays in the mid 80s. Since then power companies are depending on 
their stored supplies of replacement parts. A common practice is the replacement by a protective relay 
from a spare feeder.  
 
The stretching of inspection intervals has become a common practice. The liberalization of the Dutch 
energy market is a factor of influence in this. The preventive maintenance approach is more and more 
shifting to a condition based approach.  
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2   Analysis on impact of (cascaded) outages caused by failing protective 
relays. 
 
2.1. Technical consequences for a system operator. 
System operators (TSOs/LNOs1) )are supposed to reconnect the disconnected area as fast as possible. 
The general process of restoration after an interruption is described in [3], [4] and is described as 
follows: 
1. Signaled interruption  
2. Assign recovery crew 
3. Localize fault 
4. Isolate fault 
5. Close opened switches en reroute grid openings 
 
The time needed for signaling an interruption depends on the way this is done. Most substations are 
equipped with remote sensing and network control. In some cases this remote sensing fails to signal. 
In these cases the signaling time is determined by the first call of a customer. The following 
timeframes are greatly dependent on the company strategy for remedial actions. A recovery process 
can be divided in four different phases. These phases are: 
1. Re-closing in outage opened switches 
2. Re-closing original grid openings, in the case they were opened in the recovery process 
3. Commissioning temporary power supply (only if this is a faster process than repair or 
interruption of maintenance) 
4. Repair or interruption of maintenance. 
 
The recovery process [8] in terms of time describes the time needed to restore the delivery of power. 
A total estimate time needed for restoration of power delivery can be described as follows: 
  
Trestoration = Tsignaling + Trecoverycrew +Tlocalize + Tisolation + Tswitching
  (eq.1) 
 
Wherein Tswitching depends on the way in which the power delivery is restored and can be defined by 
the described phases: 
Phase 1:  Tswitching = Treclose      (eq.2) 
Phase 2:  Tswitching = Treclose + Treroute     (eq.3) 
Phase 3:  Tswitching = Talternative supply     (eq.4) 
Phase 4:  Tswitching = minimum (Trepair , Tmaintenance interruption)  (eq.5) 
 
The figure below shows a flow diagram wherein the decisions and the transitions in the restoration 
process are described: 
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Figure 3. Restoration process flow diagram 
 
The grid configuration determines the way in which recovery process is carried out greatly. Meshed or 
radial grid configurations have different technical recovery requirements. For a dead end feeder in a 
radial grid it may be necessary to arrange a temporary power supply. Medium voltage installations in 
meshed grids consist mostly of two or more bus bar (rail) systems. These setups shorten the duration 
of an outage considerably since a temporary supply doesn’t have to be arranged in all cases. Without 
falling into detail, with a multi bus bar system it is possible to isolate the faulted bus bar and connect 
the feeder to another bus bar. Figure 1 in paragraph 1.1. shows some basic examples of these bus 
bar systems in medium voltage installations. The picture shows that a load behind a double bus bar 
setup can be supplied through either one of the two of the bus bars. The circuit breaker which is 
tripped by a defective relay can isolate the affected bus bar. 
 
There are two choices in dealing with a defective protective relay: 
• Repair 
• Exchange 
 
In practice, exchange of defective relays is carried out only. An exchange can be done by replacement 
of an equal type or new modern type relay. Replacing a defective relay by an equal type can be done 
in some cases. Sometimes such a relay is in stock, or a spare feeder is equipped with such a relay. 
Exchanging with relay from a spare feeder is a temporary solution and should be considered so. 
Exchanging a defective relay with a modern type takes more time since modern relays are not always 
interchangeable. Some technical modifications have to be made.  
1) TSOs/LNOs : Transmission system operator / Local network operator 
Calculating time for fault signalling+trouble shooting 
crew + fault location + isolation action +circuit 
breaker closing action 
Close next opened isolation switch 
Power 
restored  
and no 
Other switch  
possible? 
Emergency 
generator? 
Maintenance  
interruption? 
Sum up restoration durations and assign to 
each affected component 
Component repair 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
N 
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2.2. Economical impact of outage on system operators.  
After an interruption is signaled, a transmission system operator (TSO)/local network operator (LNO) 
has to deal with the following issues: 
• Restoration process 
• Liability 
 
The restoration process is strongly dependent on the setup of the infrastructure. A meshed or radial 
system requires in most cases different approaches. A more detailed explanation of the restoration 
process is given in the next paragraph. In some cases it is needed arrange a temporary power supply. 
The cost of such a measure is evaluated with what priority is given to the disconnected customers. A 
TSO/LNO can take the liability issue into account when deciding what measures should be taken in the 
restoration process. TSOs/LNOs are subjected to a directive enforced by DTE1. This directive states 
that customers are entitled to compensation when an interruption exceeds a 4-hour duration. In the 
frame below a more detailed description of this directive is given. 
 
 
E 35  for households and small businesses (shops, small offices) up to 60kW 
E 910  for large businesses (offices, factories) in the range 60 kW-3 MW 
E 0,35/kW for large industrial customers of over 3 MW with a maximum of E 91.000) 
 
Excluded: in case of an outage due to actions of another service provider or if the outage 
is a necessary measure to reestablish balance in the system’s supply and demand. 
 
Source:  “Advies van de Energieraad over aansprakelijkheid bij leveringsonderbrekingen”, Algemene Energieraad, October 
2003, p20. 
 
According to [5, page 29], this directive is meant to stimulate TSOs/LNOs to prevent interruption 
duration to exceed 4 hours. In practice, this directive doesn’t stimulate TSOs/LNOs to restore 
interruptions of short duration. In this sense, this directive influences the reliability/quality of the grid. 
To give an impression of the magnitude of paid compensation, in 2001 about 2,5 million euros was 
paid to a group of 60.000 customers.  
 
The cost that comes with the process of restoration varies depending on what technical issues come 
into play. For this reason it can be useful to recognize certain scenarios. In these scenarios the 
influence of liability and the associated cost should be taken into account. Liability can become a more 
influencing factor since proposals for a new directive are being developed, see [6] for more 
background information. 
 
1) DTE Dutch office for energy regulation is an organization that enforces rules to prohibit the forming of monopolies and price 
agreements between network operators  
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2.3. Societal impact of outages. 
It makes no difference for a customer what causes an outage. In the perspective of outages due to a 
failing protection system the impact of an outage will not be experienced differently than an outage 
caused by for example a damaged cable.   
 
A report [7, pp iii-iv] describes the costs of outages and factors that influence the impact of an outage 
on society. These factors are: 
• The type of customer 
Companies are confronted with three kinds of damages as a result of an outage. First they 
produce less and production has to be started up again. Second cost may rise. Sometimes 
extra labor input is needed. And third companies can still experience inconvenience after an 
outage because of stagnating supply input. The inconvenience of an outage for households is 
in most cases not being able to carry out housekeeping tasks or being entertained by 
television or radio. 
• Perceived reliability level 
Dutch grids are, as stated in an earlier paragraph, very reliable. A consequence of this is that 
customers are relying on a continuous delivery of energy and will be less prepared for an 
outage. 
• The moment an outage is happening 
An outage during working hours or in the evenings has for both types of customers different 
consequences. An outage during working hours is more inconvenient for companies than for 
households. 
• The duration of an outage 
The duration of an outage can become a critical issue. In winter households or a company like 
a chicken farm cannot stay disconnected for a long period. 
• (Un) announced outage 
Some outages are planned or are announced. In these cases the power company and the 
customers can take measures to minimize the effects of the outage. 
• Plenary / incidental outages 
Also in these cases both customer and power company can take measures to minimize the 
effect of the outage. 
• Size of the supplied area 
A larger supply area covers, in most cases, more customers. In these cases it is possible that 
loss of public services like trams, trains and metros are also consequences of an outage.  
 
 
 
   17 
3   Technique for investigating failure behavior of e.m. protective relays 
 
3.1. Investigating causes of failures of e.m. protective relays 
The way in which protective relays fail can in some cases tell a lot about what cause is accountable for 
this. Experienced engineers recognize the failure modes and know what effects these failure modes 
have on the components performance. A systematic way for documenting this knowledge is the 
Failure mode effect analysis (FMEA). The international standard IEC 812 describes the FMEA 
procedure.  As a supplemental analysis to the FMEA, a criticality analysis (CA) can be carried out to 
focus the attention scope on to critical failure modes. FMEA or FMECA is an exhaustive procedure that 
results in an as complete as possible list of failure modes and causes for failures. Also part of the 
FMECA is composing a list of failure detection methods. The herein presented results of the FMECA 
procedure [8] are supplemented with an analysis of current maintenance practices.  
3.2. Failure mode effect and criticality analysis 
FMECA is part of a maintenance development program called the Reliability Centered Maintenance 
(RCM) or Maintenance Steering Group (MSG) method. This program consists of 6 steps which result in 
the definition of a new maintenance program. The RCM/MSG1 method is described as follows: 
 
1. Technical system decomposition:  which components form  the technical systems 
2. Recognize significant components:  on what components should attention be focused 
3. Failure mode analysis:   investigate failure behavior of components 
4. Select maintenance policy:   evaluate maintenance necessities 
5. Specify maintenance task:   describe process of maintenance activities 
6. Define maintenance program:   organize maintenance activities 
 
The goal of the FMECA procedure here is to find answers for the following questions: 
• What is a likely way in which a part fails? 
• What mechanisms are responsible for these failure modes? 
• What could the effects be if the failures did occur? 
• Is the failure in the safe or unsafe direction? 
• How is a failure detected? 
• What inherent provisions are provided in the design to compensate for the failure? 
 
These questions are fitted into a structured approach defined by the IEC 812 standard. The IEC812 
standard states that information necessary for carrying out a FMECA should cover (if possible) three 
categories. These categories are: 
1. System structure 
2. System initiation, operation, control and maintenance 
3. System environment 
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The next figure shows an overview of how the FMECA is organized: 
 
 
Figure 4. FMECA spreadsheet overview 
 
This forms the basis for the developed FMECA spreadsheet program treated in the next paragraphs 
 
Remarks 
1) RCM/MSG- method as described by prof. K. Smit TUDelft, Aerospace engineering 
 
 
 
FMECA sheet 
RPN input 
sheets 
Commissioning Manual 
Maintenance manual 
Maintenance registration 
Questionnaire 
 
FMECA output   
List of detection provisions 
List of failure modes, failure 
causes and failure effects 
Pareto diagram 
Criticality grid 
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3.3. Implementation of the FMECA in a spreadsheet 
The basic questions of a failure mode effect and critcality analysis can be implemented in a FMECA 
sheet. There are many appearances of this FMECA sheet, for this analysis one appearance is added to 
this collection. A regular FMECA sheet shows the a part of or the whole set of components that form 
the system. Here the whole set of components is subjected to the analysis. The here developed 
FMECA sheet is designed with help of the following design rules: 
 
• A clear hierarchical view on system-subsystem-component relationships. 
• Guidance in following the basic FMECA questions. 
• Focus on RPN by seperate input sheets for RPN inputs (Detection and Severity) 
• Focus on important end results (End effect and RPN ranking) by color sensitive 
Input/output. 
 
3.3.1. Developed FMECA sheet 
These design rules and evaluation of some appearances of FMECA sheets and the use of the IEC812 
standard resulted in the following FMECA sheet: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Developed FMECA sheet 
 
The call-out balloons show how the FMECA sheet is organised and the influence of three of the design 
rules.   
 
 
System – subsystem -
component 
Basic FMECA questions RPN Ranking cells 
RPN Score, ranked by 
number and graded by color 
End Effect-Severity 
related by color 
Subsystem 1 
“U-magnet” 
 
Subsystem 2 
“Drag magnet” 
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3.3.2. Inputs of the FMECA sheet 
The basic input of a FMECA sheet is the textual description of the following: 
• Subsystem. 
• System element (component). 
• Function. 
• Failure mode. 
• Failure cause 
• Local effect of failure 
• End effect of failure 
• Detection provisions 
• Preventive actions 
 
Information about these subjects can be obtained from: 
• Technical manuals 
• Maintenance descriptions  
• and other related documents  
 
The described subjects cover most basic FMECA questions. The next picture shows how the basic 
input is organised: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Input frame for subsystem-component information and basic FMECA questions. 
 
One design rule concerns the separated input of the Risk Priority Number ranking (RPN). It’s a ranking 
method for recognizing the most critical failures by giving them a score. This ranking method makes it 
possible to analyze the failure by use of PARETO analysis. The PARETO analysis arranges the results 
by the weight of the RPN ranking.  
 
The PARETO analysis is explained further on. The RPN consists of the multiplication of 3 scores, 
namely: 
 
    SODRPN c ××=   (eq.5) 
Input cells for subsystem- 
component information 
Input cells for basic FMECA 
questions 
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RPNc  : Risk priority number of component 
D  : Detection score 
O : Occurrence score 
S : Severity score 
 
In this FMECA sheet a 5 level score has been applied. This 5 level score is not described by a 
standard. Here the choice for 5 levels is based on how the information is obtained. In an interview 
questions are answered intuitively. A question could be constructed by for example:  
 
Does component x fail? And in what extent does this occur? Recurrent/conceivable/sporadic/isolated 
or unlikely 
 
In a qualitative approach it is possible to apply a score method as proposed here. The possible 
outcomes of the 5 level scores are: 
 
Table 5. possible outcomes of a 5 level score 
    
1 1 1 1 
1 1 2 2 
1 1 3 3 
1 1 4 4 
1 1 5 5 
1 2 2 4 
1 2 3 6 
1 2 4 8 
1 2 5 10 
1 3 3 9 
1 3 4 12 
1 3 5 15 
1 4 5 20 
1 5 5 25 
2 4 4 32 
2 5 5 50 
2 4 5 40 
3 5 5 75 
4 5 5 100 
5 5 5 125 
 
This uniform score method results in the following 5 level RPN:  
 
Table 6. RPN score categories 
         RPN = 1 
  1 < RPN ≤ 25 
25 < RPN ≤ 50 
50 < RPN ≤ 100 
      100 < RPN ≤ 125 
 
In the end result, the RPN, also 5 levels are used for the separation of levels. In the FMECA sheet 
these end result of the RPN calculation can be found in numerical way and by the corresponding color 
as indicated in the figure above.  
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The 5 level score is translated to the RPN categories in the following way: 
 
Table 7. Score tables for RPN inputs 
Severity score  
Score   
catastrophic  5 
critical  4 
moderate  3 
marginal  2 
minor  1 
Detection score   
Score   
Absolute uncertain  5 
Remote  4 
Low  3 
High  2 
Almost certain  1 
Occurrence score   
Score   
Recurrent  5 
Conceivable  4 
Sporadic  3 
Isolated  2 
Unlikely  1 
 
• The severity score is related on the end effect of a failure mode.  
• The detection score is based on the likelihood of detecting a failure with the means and skill 
of maintenance personnel. 
• The occurrence score is based on information from interviews. 
 
The score tables show a color coding. This color coding is active in the separate input frames that 
make an input sheet. It’s a visual aid that makes the input sheet more readable and ensures that all 
inputs are filled out. The following picture shows an example of a part of a Detection input sheet: 
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High 2 2 2   2 2 2 2 
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Figure 7. Example of a part of an input sheet for one of the scores 
 
Score input frame 
Subsystem-
component-failure 
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The example of the input sheet shows an input frame for a group of components in a subsystem. The 
descriptive part in the input sheet shows the relationship between causes for failures and components 
in subsystems. This descriptive part is also used in the severity input sheet. The Severity input sheet is 
shown below: 
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Figure 8. Example of a part of an input sheet for one of the scores 
 
Each input is linked to the corresponding column and cell in the detection or severity column of the 
FMECA sheet. The information about detection and severity can be obtained from the technical 
documentation. 
 
For the occurrence it is possible to construct the input sheet in the same way. Here this is done 
directly in the main FMECA sheet. In this case it doesn’t make sense to add a separate input sheet for 
the occurrence. It would mean that every component should be given an occurrence score by asking a 
maintenance engineer their experience on each component. The recognized failure modes are 
observed phenomena. Also, failure modes are properties that can be shared by more components. By 
asking maintenance engineers their experience in occurrence of failure modes with the mentioned 
score categories recurrent, conceivable, sporadic, isolated or unlikely it is possible to give a 
occurrence score for every component related to the failure mode.  
Score input frame 
Subsystem-
component-failure 
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3.3.3. outputs of the FMECA sheet 
The IEC 812 standard describes what results can be obtained from the analysis, these are: 
• List of detection provisions 
• List of failure modes, failure causes and failure effects 
• Pareto diagram 
• Criticality grid 
 
The list of detection provisions, failure modes, failure causes and failure effects can be extracted from 
the FMECA sheet easily. It can be done by reading the columns and summarizing them by categories. 
The Pareto diagram and the Criticality grid are not constructed as the standard prescribes. Normally, a 
PARETO analysis is carried out on component level. Since the analysis concerns subsystems it is 
necessary to adapt the calculation method. The criticality grid is normally constructed by evaluation of 
the probability of failure wit the Severity of a failure. Here the criticality grid is constructed with the 
occurrence and the severity of a failure mode. Next paragraph explains how this is done. 
 
3.4 Analysis of the FMECA results 
The FMECA sheet can be analyzed with two techniques. These are: 
• Pareto analysis 
• Criticality grid 
 
Both techniques are common used techniques. Here these techniques are adapted to the subsystem 
approach and the failure mode approach; these will be explained in the next sub paragraphs. The 
presented approaches are new and developed for the her presented analysis. 
3.4.1. Pareto Analysis 
The PARETO diagram is mostly a result of a PARETO analysis of all components. A PARETO analysis is 
an analysis based on the rule that 20 percent of the components are accountable for 80 percent of the 
failures, the PARETO rule. This analysis is normally carried out on component level. Here it is carried 
out on subsystem level. The reason for choosing this approach is to make insightful which subsystem 
is most accountable for the failing of the total system.   
 
For this approach an adaptation of the component RPN’s into subsystem RPN’s is necessary. 
Subsystems mostly don’t consist of the same amount of components. For this reason the influence of 
amount of components present in subsystems needs to be discarded. This influence can be discarded 
in the following way: 
• Sum all component RPN’s of all components of a particular subsystem. 
• Divide the summed components RPN by the number of components in the subsystem and the 
maximum scores of Detection, Occurrence and Severity. 
• Multiply the total score with scale factor 100 
 
This results in in the following equation: 
100
125
1 ×
×
=
∑
=
=
n
RPN
RPN
nc
c
c
w   (eq.6) 
n  : Number of components 
125   : maximum score of Detection, Occurence and Severity (=5) 
 
The separate calculation of subsystem RPN’s and arranging them with the PARETO technique results 
in PARETO diagram. The following example shows a result table and PARETO diagram of a system: 
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Table 8. example of a weighted RPN table 
weighted     
Category RPN shares percentages 
cumulative 
percentages 
Subsystem 1 24 31% 31%  
Subsystem 2 21 27% 59%  
Subsystem 3 15 19% 78%  
Subsystem 4 12 16% 94%  
Subsystem 5 5 6% 100%  
Remark: the table is an result of a fictitious system 
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Figure 9. Example of PARETO diagram of a fictitous system 
 
3.4.2. Criticality grid 
The criticality grid is a method to indicate which components are most likely to fail and what effect 
this failing has on the total system. It has its use in the decision process of taking corrective actions. 
Criticality grids are mostly constructed by plotting probability of failures and the severity of the failure. 
This way construction is common for the quantitative approach. The IEC812 standard does not 
prescribe a standard method for constructing a criticality grid, so it is possible to construct the 
criticality grid with other parameters than probability of failure and the severity of a failure. Here, the 
parameters used for the criticality grid here, are: 
• The Occurrence score of the failure mode.  
• The Severity score of the failure mode.  
 
This setup of the developed criticality grid gives insight in the occurrence of failure modes and the 
severity related to these failure modes. The occurrence is a variable input so when a failure mode’s 
occurrence is increasing; its criticality will increase too. The next figure shows a criticality grid based 
on these parameters: 
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Occurrence     Severity     
  Insignificant minor Moderate Significant Catastrophic 
recurrent {2}     
conceivable    {1,4,7}  
sporadic     {6} 
isolated  {8}  {3,5}  
unlikely      
 
Figure 10. Example of criticality grid 
 
The criticality grid here shows also here a 5 level score for each parameter. The way of ranking 
Criticality is multiplying the failure mode Occurrence score with the failure mode Severity score. The 
following formula explains this: 
 
Criticality of a failure mode:  fmfm SOyCriticalit ×=   (eq.7) 
 
Ofm : Occurrence score of a failure mode 
Sfm : Severity score of a failure mode 
 
The maximum outcome is 25 (5x5) and the minimum outcome is 1 (1x1). The criticality grid 
parameters concern the criticality of failure modes. This means that all Occurrence scores are 
analyzed on the average score outcome of components that are related to failure modes. This is done 
in likewise for the Severity, all Severities are analyzed on the average score outcome of components. 
This is described by the following formulas: 
 
Severity of a failure mode:   
n
S
S
nc
c
c
fm
∑
=
=
=
1
    (eq.8) 
Sfm : Severity score of a failure mode 
Sc : Severity score of the component related to the failure mode 
n : number of components related to the failure mode 
 
 
Occurrence of a failure mode:  
n
O
O
nc
c
c
fm
∑
=
=
=
1
    (eq.9) 
Ofm : Occurrence score of a failure mode 
Oc : Occurrence score of the component related to the failure mode 
n : number of components related to the failure mode 
 
The calculation of the average of severities and occurrences of failure modes can result in numbers 
with fractions. To make these fractions fit for a 5 level score, a round off rule is applied.  
• Fractions ≥0.5 are rounded to 1 
• Fractions <0.5 are rounded to 0 
 
The 5 level score in the criticality grid can be maintained in this way. The following criticality grid 
shows how the 25 criticality outcome combinations of Ofm x Sfm are put into the grid.  
Failure modes 
are numbered 
and filled out 
in a criticality 
cell 
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Occurrence     Severity     
  Insignificant minor Moderate Significant Catastrophic 
recurrent 5x1 5x2 5x3 5x4 5x5 
conceivable 4x1 4x2 4x3 4x5 4x5 
sporadic 3x1 3x2 3x3 3x4 3x5 
isolated 2x1 2x2 2x3 2x4 2x5 
unlikely 1x1 2x1 1x3 1x4 1x5 
 
Figure 11. Example of criticality grid with outcome combinations 
 
Some combinations are colored differently though the outcome is the same. This should be 
interpreted in the following way:  
 
Outcome 3x4 is the same as outcome 4x3, when looking at the formula (eq.3) it is clear that 
the failure mode occurrence and the failure mode severity differ in score. The color indicates 
that the importance is set on severity of failure modes.  
 
 
 
 
 
Score 
combinations of 
failure mode 
criticality 
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4   Analysis on failure behavior of e.m. protective relays 
4.1. system definition 
4.1.1 Analyzed protective relay 
The analyzed system is an over current relay with a system setup as manufactured by ABB and 
General Electric. Specific types are ABB CO-series and GE I/JFC series. The relay is a single phase over 
current protective relay with time delay and instantaneous unit. The motivation for choosing this type 
of relays (GE-I/JFC, ABB-CO) is: 
• This setup is constructed with an induction disk actuation part and an armature attracted 
actuation part. (contains most common features of e.m. protective relays) 
• The availability of technical brochures and related documents motivates the choice for this 
type.  
 
The gathered documentation covers the following information categories: 
1. System structure 
2. System initiation, operation, control and maintenance 
3. System environment 
 
Categories 1 and 2 are covered by the use of instruction [10] and adjustment [9] manuals. As a 
reference for category 2, also interviews with maintenance engineers have been conducted. The 
system environment is recognized as a dry to humid (rarely damp), clean (minor dust presence) 
environment.  
 
The relay is designed for continuous operation and is used as for medium voltage feeder and 
transformer protection. This induction disk relay is on the market since the late 70s. The figures below 
show the analyzed electromechanical protective relay and it’s location in a schematic: 
 
    
Figure 12. GE relay 12IFC53B1A                     Figure 13. Schematic location of relay 
 
The document “Adjustment techniques for electromechanical relays” gives a more detailed description 
of the relay. The relay is composed of the following parts: 
 
- Disc stop arm 
- Stationary contact & zero time dial 
- Disc centering and end play 
- Time dial 
- Drag magnet 
- Seal in unit 
- Instantaneous unit 
- Disk 
- Support mold 
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- Casing 
 
A similar description of system parts can be found in the “ABB descriptive bulletin 41-101E” [10]. 
Protective relays like the I/JFC series are part of combination of a circuit breaker + protective relay + 
measurement transformers. The protective relay is connected via a current- or voltage transformer 
with the feeder and via the trip circuit with the circuit breaker. In the FMECA procedure only the 
protective relay is submitted to further analysis.  
 
4.1.2. Short description of the principle of operation 
The analyzed system consists of main and backup system. The main system operates on an induction 
disk principle. The backup system is a so called armature type relay. The following figures illustrate 
the principle of operation of these two different types of systems. The added descriptions explain 
briefly how the systems operate. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Common schematic setup of an induction unit 
 
The instantaneous unit, the backup relay, and also the seal in unit have a different principle of 
operation. The figure below illustrates this. 
 
 
Figure 15. Common schematic setup of an instantaneous unit 
 
 
Current flows into the two 
coils, poles,  that create a 
magnetic flux. This magnetic 
flux is induced in the metal 
disk. The interactions of 
these two fluxes generate a 
torque that will cause the 
disk to travel thus closing 
the trip circuit by the closure 
of the moving contact with 
the stationary contact.  
 
Current passes the coil on 
terminal 5 and 6. This creates 
a magnetic field which exerts a 
force on the armature. The 
armature travels when an over 
current occurs and closes the 
moving contact with the 
stationary contact. This closes 
the trip circuit of the circuit 
breaker. 
   30 
4.2. Developed functional block diagram and subsystem decomposition 
The following functional block diagram of an electromechanical protective relay has been developed in 
order to make a distinction between the purposes of subsystems that form an e.m. protective relay. 
An electromagnetic protective relay can be described by four basic processes: 
• Time setting & Calibration 
• Detection 
• Actuation 
• Tripping 
 
The diagram below shows the relationships between the four processes: 
 
 
 
 Figure 16. Basic functional diagram of a protective relay 
 
The time setting & calibration process has a strong influence on the 3 other processes. The splitting 
up of the system in 4 processes helps to give insight in which part of the relay failures occur. So it is 
possible to determine where the effort of maintenance should be set. 
 
Also a reliability block diagram can be constructed. A reliability block diagram shows the influence of 
sub processes on the main process. A reliability block diagram of a protective relay can be constructed 
as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Basic reliability block diagram of a protective relay 
 
The figure shows that the reliability block diagram of a protective relay is a series model1. This means 
that all functional processes form a chain wherein every step has a direct influence on the reliability.  
Start: 
CT/VT 
Detection: 
Current/e
mf in coils 
Actuation: 
Travel of 
disk 
Tripping: 
Closing 
contacts + 
latching 
End: 
CB 
   31 
Two statements can be made according to this: 
• The weakest subsystem determines the reliability of the whole system. 
• All subsystems have to operate to ensure functional operation of the whole system. 
 
Reliability of series systems can be calculated with: 
 
∏
=
=
n
i is
RR
0
   (10) 
 
With:  n= number of elements 
 Rs= reliability of the system 
 Ri= reliability of the ith element 
 
Rewritten for diagram 2:  tads RRRR ••=    (11) 
 
With: Rd = reliability of subsystem detection 
 Ra = reliability of subsystem actuation 
 Rt = reliability of subsystem tripping 
 
To determine the separate reliabilities of all subsystems it is necessary to recognize failure 
mechanisms and to quantify these failure mechanisms. These failure mechanisms can be for example:  
• Time delayed. 
• Gradual. 
• Sudden. 
 
Time delayed and gradual based failure mechanisms can be observed by maintenance engineers. It 
depends on the skill of the engineer whether this is recognized.  
 
Remarks: 1) Inside the three recognized subsystems some parallel processes can be found. A component level 
reliability model will show this. The herein presented subsystem approach gives a series model as a result. 
4.3. Decomposition of the system into subsystems and subsystem elements 
The chosen setup, described in the former paragraph, can be decomposed into subsystems. The 
decomposition can be carried out by using the terminology of the functional block diagram. This 
results in the following figure: 
 
Figure 18. Decomposition of subsystems of a induction disk relay 
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The four process description is applicable to other existing relay setups as described in [5].  
 
One system has not been submitted to the former figure. A subsystem like an instantaneous unit is 
actually also a protective relay and has also a similar subsystem decomposition. In this case the 
actuation subsystem is different. Here, the actuation subsystem consists of an armature. Other 
differences are the simpler setup of the whole system. The figure below shows the overview of 
subsystems of the instantaneous unit.   
 
 
 
Figure 19. Decomposition of subsystems of an instantaneous unit 
 
A further decomposition of the subsystems results in a total overview of subsystems and their 
associated components. The result of this decomposition results in the following overviews. 
  
 
 
Figure 20. Overview of subsystem “time setting and calibration” and its related components 
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Figure 21. Overview of subsystem “Detection” and its related components 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Overview of subsystem “Actuation” and its related components 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Overview of subsystem “Tripping” and its related components 
 
These overviews form the basis on which FMECA procedure is carried out. The FMECA sheet in 
appendix 2 is based on the described subsystems and components. 
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4.4. Failure modes, causes and effects 
The identification of failure modes, causes and their effects resulted in a list of 54 events in 21 
components of which an overview can be found in the FMECA sheet in appendix 2. These events are 
summarized into 10 failure modes with 11 general causes and 4 end effects. The following figure 
shows the relationships between causes, failure modes and end effects. 
 
 
 
Figure 25. Failure causes, failure modes and potential effects of an induction disk relay 
 
The failure effects explain in which way a failure mode affects the operation of a protective relay. The 
function of a protective relay is to energize the trip circuit of a circuit breaker. This will cause the 
circuit breaker to isolate the faulted line. The failure effects as described in the table above are 
defined as follows: 
 
Table 9. Descriptions of failure effects 
Failure effect 
 
Description 
No trip 
 
System does not generate a trip signal. Circuit breaker does not act in 
fault situation. 
Delayed trip 
 
System generates a trip signal but not within required time constraint. 
Circuit breaker acts on trip signal but is stressed longer. 
Early trip 
 
System generates a trip signal earlier than the required time constraint. 
Circuit breaker acts on trip signal.  
Trip without seal in 
 
System generates a trip signal but does not energize circuit breaker trip 
circuit sufficiently. Circuit breaker does not act in fault situation. 
 
These four failure effects can be assigned to general categories, which are useful when defining a 
performance indicator for protective relays. These categories are:  
• Missing operation [No trip, No seal in] 
• Unwanted operation [Delayed trip, Early trip] 
No trip 
 
Delayed trip 
 
Early trip 
 
Trip w/o seal in. 
Sticking/No actuation 
Loose 
Damaged/broken 
Stuck/too tightened 
Poor disk in gap 
alignment 
Short circuit 
No detection 
Loose/Untightened 
parts 
Bad electrical contact 
No electrical contact 
Wrong setting 
Dirt/dust 
Corrosion 
Rough handling 
Aged insulation Conditional 
 
Disconnected (taps) 
Degradation of 
magnetic properties 
Decreased magnetic 
strength 
Causes FailureModes Effects 
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4.5. Detectability of component failures 
Component failures can be detected with the following procedures/means: 
• Non invasive visual inspection  
• Invasive inspection maintenance ( checking components by procedures)  
• Functional testing with test sets or other testing means 
• Measurement of input and output circuitry 
• Inspection of terminals 
 
The next table gives a description of what activities are included in the methods 
 
Table 11. Descriptions of maintenance activities 
Maintenance 
 
Inspection: 
Visual (non invasive) 
• Inspection on dirt, dust or other foreign materials 
• Inspection of the insulation of internal leads/wiring  
• Checking the settings on the scale 
• Checking the flag indication 
• Terminal connections 
Visual (invasive) 
• Checking gaps 
• Checking contacts 
• Checking pivots and bearings 
• Checking moving parts 
 
Mechanical adjustments (invasive) 
• Bearings/pivots 
• Tightening screws 
• Contacts 
 
Auxilliary  Measurements 
• Wye point measurement input circuitry 
• Measurement output circuitry 
 
Functional testing 
• Settings 
• Pickup/drop out 
• Timing (characteristic) 
• Instantaneous 
• Flag indication / Seal in unit 
• Trip circuit test (protectiver relay + circuit breaker) if possible 
 
 
The detection of component failures depends on the following factors: 
• skill of maintenance engineers 
• method of detection  
• simplicity/complexity of relay setups 
 
An insightful detection method, easy and obvious, results in a unique, unquestionable, interpretation. 
This is not always the case with detection methods applied in maintenance on e.m. protective relays.  
 
Most failures at e.m. protective relays are detected during the maintenance process. A functional test 
is mostly carried out as a first step in an inspection. When it passes this test, it is often not needed to 
take more steps. Sometimes the test shows that relay doesn’t operate as the intended setting 
indicates. A (re)calibration of the settings is in most cases sufficient enough. In other cases other 
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means of detection methods should be used. A setting or (re)calibration procedure can also reveal 
failure phenomena. However, such a procedure is not intended as a detection method.  
 
The following table shows the methods/techniques and the failures they can detect: 
 
Table 11. Detection of component failure matrix 
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Coils No No Yes Yes No 
Contacts No No Yes Yes No 
Wiring (external) Yes No  Yes Yes 
(Other)Mechanical 
parts 
No No Yes No No 
Settings Yes Yes No No No 
Protection up/down No Yes No No No 
Accessory eqt. No Yes No No No 
      
 
 
With the application of these methods and the use of the means it is possible to detect all failures.  
 
Remarks: 
1) A functional test determines whether a protective relay operates with the specified settings. An “Up” status indicates that a 
relay works according to the settings, a “down” status could indicate that the relay doesn’t operate according to the settings or 
a fail to operate. 
2) Case open inspection / maintenance is a labor-intensive measure to find component failures. This measure can only by carried 
out by well-trained maintenance engineers.  
3) Tightening screws / pulling wiring connections are activities which are carried out at the terminal block, external wiring to the 
CT’s / VT’s and other external connections. 
4) The group “mechanical parts” represents the group of broken, bent, damaged, Loose and stuck parts. 
5) Current and voltage transformers are regarded as accessory equipment. 
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4.6. Analysis of RPNw and criticality of failure modes   
The following paragraphs are based on the information gathered in the FMECA sheet and the input 
sheets of detection and severity.  
4.6.1 Pareto analysis 
A method which can be related to the functional block diagram is a Pareto analysis of the subsystem 
Risk Priority Number (RPNw). This method, described in chapter 3, evaluates all 54 events. Appendix 3 
contains the RPNw calculation tables used for this analysis. The result of this calculation is summarized 
in the following table: 
 
Table 12. calculated RPNw of subsystems 
Subsystem RPNw percentages 
cumulative 
percentages 
Detection 24 39% 39% 
Tripping 19 30% 68% 
Time setting & calibration 13 20% 89% 
Actuation 7 11% 100% 
 
With these result the next figure is constructed: 
 
Pareto Analysis RPN weighted
0
5
10
15
20
25
Tripping Detection time setting &
calibration
Actuation
Categories
R
P
N
 w
e
ig
h
te
d
 
s
c
o
re
s
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
c
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
 p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
s
 
Figure 19. Subsystem Pareto analysis. 
 
The figure shows that components in subsystems Tripping and Detection require more 
maintenance attention in comparison to subsystems Time setting & Calibration and Actuation. 
This means that when maintenance is focused on components in these subsystems, that most failures 
can be prevented. According to this analysis the following components should be inspected during 
maintenance: 
Table 13.  Crucial components 
Subsystem      
Tripping     Detection   
          
Tapped coil (su)   Coil upper pole   
Contacts (su)   Coil lower pole   
Upper stationary contact Taps    
Lower stationary contact      
Moving contact        
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In short it can be said that measurement of input / output circuitry and checking contacts should be 
part of an inspection.  
4.6.2. Criticality grid 
The criticality grid is constructed by calculating the occurrence (Ofm) and the severity (Sfm) of a failure 
mode. The method of calculation is described in chapter 3 and the results of this calculation can be 
found in Appendix 3. The criticality grid of failure modes is constructed with the values: 
 
Table 14. Occurrence and Severity ranking of failure modes 
 Failure modes Occurrence score Severity score 
1 No actuation 2 4 
2 Decr. Magn. Strength 1 3 
3 Loose 1 4 
4 Damaged (broken) 2 With debris=> delayed trip  : 4 
5 Stuck / too tightened 1 No effect if settings ok : 1, else 3 
6 Poor disk alignment 1 Poorly aligned=>Delayed trip : 4 
7 Short circuit 3 5 
8 No detection 2 5 
9 Bad electrical contact 3 4 
10 No electrical contact 3 5 
    
 
This results in the following criticality grid: 
 
Occurrence     Severity     
  Insignificant Minor Moderate Critical Catastrophic 
Recurrent           
Conceivable         
Sporadic     9 7,10 
Isolated      1,3,4 8 
Unlikely     2,5 6   
 
Figure 27. Criticality grid 
 
This criticality grid shows that most failure modes have a criticality in the unsafe direction. The 
variable factor here is the occurrence of the failure mode. Now failure modes are observed sporadic, 
when a failure mode is observed more often this would mean that failure mechanisms are influencing 
the reliable operation of e.m. protective relays. Measures for corrective actions should be taken. Here 
it means that in the case of an increase observations of failure modes of {1,3,4,6,9,10} the 
occurrence changes to Conceivable or even Recurrent. Failure modes {9,10} result in an inoperative 
e.m. protective relay. Failure modes {1,3,4,6} cause delayed trips and can result in the disconnection 
of a larger area than the faulted area. The backup protection is supposed to take over the function of 
this e.m. protective relay. 
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4.7. Review of FMECA suggested detection methods and detection methods in current 
maintenance practices 
Not all detection methods mentioned in the former paragraph are still applied when conducting 
maintenance on e.m. protective relays. Carrying out activities described in table 11 are part of an 
approach for keeping the e.m. protective relay in an “As new” condition. Currently, e.m. protective 
relays are not serviced to an “as new” condition. The current approach no longer includes invasive 
activities. Main reason for the “case closed” policy is to avoid environmental contamination of the 
parts (dust, moist, dirt) and to avoid physical contact with sensitive parts. Mechanical parts are not 
checked anymore. The casing of the e.m. protective relay is only opened when terminals are inside 
the casing. The table below shows the comparison of the “As new” approach and the “case closed” 
approach. 
 
Table 15. Comparison of maintenance approaches 
 
The visual inspection in the “case closed” approach is a short expert based activity. In some cases, 
this inspection is not carried out. Circuitry measurement is also applied occasionally. Typical examples 
where maintenance engineers do open the casing are for example stuck gears in the AEG SD34AK and 
moving coil elements of timing units. Maintenance procedures on protective relays have become less 
elaborate since the approach changed from “Case open” to “Case closed” maintenance.  
 
“As new” Maintenance 
 
Current maintenance activities 
(“ Case closed” maintenance) 
Inspection: 
Visual (non invasive) 
• Inspection on dirt, dust or other foreign 
materials 
• Inspection of the insulation of internal 
leads/wiring  
• Checking the settings on the scale 
• Checking the flag indication 
• Terminal connections 
Visual (invasive) 
• Checking gaps 
• Checking contacts 
• Checking pivots and bearings 
• Checking moving parts 
 
Mechanical adjustments (invasive) 
• Bearings/pivots 
• Tightening screws 
• Contacts 
 
Auxilliary  Measurements 
• Wye point measurement input circuitry 
• Measurement output circuitry 
 
Functional testing 
• Settings 
• Pickup/drop out 
• Timing (characteristic) 
• Instantaneous 
• Flag indication / Seal in unit 
• Trip circuit test (protectiver relay + 
circuit breaker) if possible 
 
Inspection: 
Visual(non invasive) 
• Checking the settings on the scale 
• Checking the flag indication 
• Terminal connections 
• Checking contacts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Auxilliary  Measurements 
• Wye point measurement input circuitry 
• Measurement output circuitry 
 
Functional testing 
• Settings 
• Instantaneous 
• Flag indication / Seal in unit 
• Trip circuit test (protective relay + circuit 
breaker) if possible 
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When taking the application of detection methods of current maintenance procedures into account, 
the detection of component failure matrix can be constructed: 
 
Table 16. Detection of component failure matrix 
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Coils No No Yes No 
Contacts No No Yes No 
Wiring Yes No Yes Yes 
(Other)Mechanical 
parts 
No No No No 
Settings Yes Yes No No 
Protection up/down No Yes No No 
Accessory eqt. No Yes No No 
     
 
Case closed maintenance results in not being able to notice mechanical component failures. The 
current maintenance approach is a pragmatic approach that is based on evaluating the functionality of 
the protective relay. It depends strongly on the skill of engineers whether this functionality evaluation 
is carried out properly.  
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5   Proposal for improvement of the acquisition of maintenance process 
information 
5.1. Gathering technical information and defining a condition indication of electro-
mechanical protective relays 
In the current situation protective relay test forms contain information about the operational status of 
protective relays. The test procedure consists in most cases at least of a pickup and timing test. The 
information obtained from testing contains information about pickup / dropout current and time 
settings. These variables give an indication of the functional status and confirm the correctness of the 
setting of the protective relay. Additional information about the effort of commissioning the relay is 
seldom registered in the test report. Such an effort is for example readjusting the time- and 
magnitude settings of the relay. These remarks are seldom registered and only when the 
readjustment is done because of a large deviation of the required setting. A fine adjustment is never 
registered as an additional remark. To find out whether a time elapsing degradation mechanism 
causes deviating settings of the relay, it is necessary to document this.  
5.2. Extracting relevant information by adding automated checklist features 
More information about the maintenance activities on e.m. protective relays could be gathered by 
including the observations and efforts in the test report. Normally such information is documented in 
the general remarks part of a test report. This is rarely done. The following table shows which 
subjects are included in current test reports and which subjects should be included extra in a test 
report for an over current e.m. protective relay: 
 
Table 17. Comparison current test report and proposed test report 
 
 
An example of such a test report can be found in appendix 5. 
In current test report 
 
In proposed test report 
• Object information. 
• Range of settings. 
• Testing means (power supply set + 
timing set). 
• Intended settings (current/time). 
• Result of zero check (test protective relay 
as found). 
• Result of pickup test  
• Result of time-current characteristics 
test. 
• Result of instantaneous pickup test. 
• Result of target and seal-in operation. 
• Result of proof test of trip circuit 
• Outcome of signaling- and trip test. 
• General remarks 
 
• All subjects in the current test report 
 
Observations: 
• Pickup function  
• Seal-in function 
• Indication (flag) 
• Trip circuit test 
• CB operates on trip 
• CT/ PT disconnected 
• Loose Lead(s) 
• Power supply disconnected 
• Contact function 
• Drop-out time meeting requirements 
 
Efforts: 
• Adjustment of time settings 
• Input circuit measurement 
• Output circuit measurement 
• Tightening terminal screws 
• Cleaning contacts 
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5.3. Framework for documenting registration subjects 
To make the current maintenance reports more fit for analysis a new framework for a test report 
should be developed. The basic format of a test report can remain the same. The test report items 
(settings, range, flag indication etc), that describe the operational status, are information, which is 
already available. Information about the observations (flag indication doesn’t work, seal in unit didn’t 
seal in),  and efforts (tightening screws, cleaning contacts etc), should be added to the format of the 
test protocol. Normally these subjects would be registered by a textual input. This makes a set of test 
protocols less fit for numerical analysis when they are collected. With the use of a numerical coding 
standard the information in the test protocol becomes numerically analyzable. How the coding works 
is explained in the next figure: 
 
 
Figure 28. Example of coding a test outcome in a Flow chart 
 
The following coding standard is used for documenting information in the new developed test report: 
 
Coding standard for documenting observations   
          
Efforts   0 Effort not carried out 
          
     1 Initial result of effort negative   
          
    9 Initial result of effort positive   
              
 
Figure 29. Coding standard for documenting information 
 
The coding standard of an observation can be done in the same way: 
Coding standard for documenting observations   
          
Efforts   0 Effort not carried out 
          
     1 Initial result of effort negative   
          
    9 Initial result of effort positive   
              
Figure 30. Coding standard for documenting observations 
 
Ok ? 
Seal in function test 
9 
1 
0 
Not functional 
Functional 
Test not conducted 
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More flow charts like figure 21 can be constructed. The possible inputs {0,1,9} related to the 
observations and efforts in the proposed test report can be found in appendix 4. The choice for the 
numbers {0,1,9} is arbitrary. The convenience of the coding standard becomes clearer with the 
following example: 
 
Example 1. 
A protective relay is subjected to a test for checking the seal-in function and doesn’t pass this test. The test engineer fixes the 
problem and the protective relay passes this test. The engineer doesn’t write this down in the remark field of the test reportl. In 
the new test protocol this activity is an item in the checklist. The first observation of the test engineer was a “fail” and is coded 
“1”.  The first result of the test is registered. By documenting it like this it is possible to find out how the functional status of the 
protective relay was when before it was brought back to a functional status.  
 
Test reports also contain information about the overall outcome of the inspection. Mostly this 
information is documented as “Pass” or “Fail”. Also for the outcome a coding standard can be used. 
The following coding standard is based on the condition indexation used by Nuon. 
 
Coding standard for documenting the outcome of the inspection 
          
Outcome    9 Functional    
          
     6 Functional (with remarks) 
          
    1 Fail-> Exchange   
              
 
Figure  31. Coding standard for the outcome of the inspection 
 
When the outcomes of inspection of protective relays need to be evaluated the coding also here 
shows its advantage. This is the case when codes {1} and {6} are used for the end result. In case of  
• {1} Exchange has to take place. 
• {6} Further analysis required before taking corrective actions. 
 
The implementation of these two coding standards results in the following test report: 
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Figure 32. Proposed test report format 
 
The report shows in what condition (functional, not functional) the relay is found and what has been 
done to make the relay functional again. A more readable format can be found in appendix 5. 
 
This test report is constructed in a spreadsheet program and has a database export sheet. The 
database export sheet makes it possible to collect the information of test protocols in a database. A 
standard data collection format for e.m. protective relays makes it possible to analyze different types 
(brands) for typical information. The new developed test protocol forms the basis for data collection 
format for over current type relays.  
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The new developed test protocol contains all information proposed in the manufacturers test protocol 
and is supplemented with a more convenient way of documenting observations and efforts. The new 
developed test protocol is organized as follows: 
 
Table 19. Organization of input frames and explanation of their purpose 
Input frame Purpose 
Input frame for documenting settings as found. 
 
The “As found” condition, results of zero check 
can be filled out here 
Input frame for documenting settings in case of 
adjustment of settings 
The new settings meet the required settings 
within a tolerance. This tolerance can be read 
back with this 
Input frame for documenting observation and 
efforts 
In case of one or more observations / have been 
done they should be filled out here. In this way 
the failure modes related to observations can be 
evaluated on occurrence so a reassessment of 
criticality can be made. 
Input frame for documenting observations and 
efforts different from mentioned. 
 
Observations and efforts different from 
mentioned 
Input frame for documenting the end result of 
the inspection. 
 
Overall result of the whole procedure.  
 
The input frames are constructed with value dependent color input cells. The set of inputs {0,1,9} or 
{1,6,9} change the color of the input cells. The test report can read back whether observations and 
efforts are done and documented. The input cells are by default {0} grey and indicate that these 
observations / efforts are not carried out yet. Not all efforts and observations need to be done to 
complete the inspection. When a relay passes the timing tests or the zero check, it is not needed to fill 
out most of the observations input cells. It can be assumed that these observation/efforts need not to 
be done. 
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5.4. Analysis of information gathered from the maintenance process.  
The earlier discussed data collection format forms the basis of the collection of test protocol results of 
all similar type protective relays. The uses of a coding standard in the test protocols prove their 
convenience when analyzing the data in a database. The information in the database can be arranged 
in such way the information in a way it becomes analyzable. The following picture shows a result of 
an import of data collection sheets of protective relays. 
 
 
Figure 33. Example of an import of a test report into a database table 
 
Remarks: the picture above is an example of a fictitious database.  
 
Here, the database is organized in a way that all types over current protective relays are collected in 
separate tables. In this way it is possible to analyze the results of inspections (Overall Pass/Fail, 
observations and efforts). Separate or combined queries arrange the information in such a way that 
trends can be observed. For example, a group of Siemens R3As7 relay shows problems with the seal-
in function or problems with pickup.  
 
By means of counting and comparing the results of this group with the results obtained from an 
earlier inspection it is possible to quantify the results in a trend diagram. An example of such a 
diagram could be: 
S
e
a
l-
in
 f
u
n
c
ti
o
n
In
d
ic
a
ti
o
n
 (
fl
a
g
) 
S
e
tt
in
g
s
C
o
n
ta
c
tf
u
n
c
ti
o
n
T
ri
p
c
ir
c
u
it
Age <30
Age >300%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
[%
]
Observations
Age [yr]
Siemens R3As7
 
Figure 34. Example of a possible solution to display trends in a group of protective relays. 
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6   Conclusions and recommendations 
 
Conclusions 
 
Developed FMECA sheet 
• A functional block diagram of an electromechanical protective relay has been developed. 
• A new quantitative method has been developed for conducting an FMECA. The subsystem 
approach shows where to concentrate maintenance efforts and is an extension of the basic 
component approach. 
• The use of an uniform five level score throughout the procedure makes scores intuitively 
comparable. 
• The presented FMECA sheet contains all features of a “standard” FMECA sheet, though the 
adaptation of the standard sheet by following new design rules improved the readability. 
 
 
Results of the FMECA procedure 
• The presented applied detection methods are sufficient for finding component failures, though 
the success of some of these methods is depending on the skill of the maintenance engineers. 
• According to the subsystem PARETO chart attention should be paid to the following 
subsystem components: Tripping  : trip circuitry (coils and contacts)  
Detection: input circuitry (coils and taps) 
• The results of the FMECA procedure on e.m. protective relays are based on available 
documents and interviews with protection specialists and engineers. The interviews have been 
conducted under six people of two companies. These companies are Siemens Nederland N.V. 
and Nuon. These companies operate as an engineering/servicing company and as a system 
operator in this field. During the interviews no contradiction in statements has been found.  
 
 
Evaluation of the Maintenance process 
• E.M. protective relays are no longer serviced to an “As new” condition. Support and 
replacement parts are hardly or no longer available. 
•  “Case closed” maintenance is an approach that avoids mechanical component failures by 
unintended “rough handling” or accumulated “dirt/dust”. Mechanical failure due to ageing 
such as corrosion can’t be detected with this approach.  
• In the actual situation, maintenance activities on protective relays are documented by a Pass 
or Fail result of functional testing. This pragmatic way of documenting results in not having 
information about what is done to keep the e.m. protective relay functional and what 
phenomena (failure modes) are observed during maintenance.  
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Proposal for improved acquisition for maintenance process information 
• The proposed test report concerns a test report of an over current type protective relay. Test 
reports for distance- and differential can be constructed in a similar way.  
• The proposed test report is organized in way to retrieve information about the condition “As 
found” and condition “As left”.  
• The {1,6,9} end result is based on a condition indexing which is used by Nuon. Here this 
condition indexing is extended by describing general categories of observations and efforts. 
The observations and efforts are given, in a similar way, a code which makes it fit for use in a 
numerical data analysis. 
• The proposed coding standard makes qualitative inspection results quantifiable for 
maintenance.   
Recommendations 
 
• Electromechanical protective relays will still be in service in the near future. This is mainly due 
to the large numbers and the low push for replacement of these components. For this reason 
it is still useful to evaluate these protective relays. 
• Current maintenance registration forms are unfit for analyzing failure behavior of e.m. 
protective relays. Using the proposed test report in Chapter 5, it will be possible to analyze 
this. The organization of this test protocol makes it possible to acquire more information 
about failure modes and failure causes. 
• Construct a database for protective relays for the collection of data form test protocols. 
• Start up a cooperation of more parties in implementing the proposed test report. Sharing and 
comparing data could lead to improved maintenance approaches on e.m. protective relays. 
• Let the maintenance engineer decide the pass or fail of a relay. The coding of observations 
and efforts could be used to construct a {6} indication in the {1,6,9} inspection outcome of a 
test protocol. 
 
 
 
   49 
References 
 
[1]  “Gebiedsindeling”, DTE august 2003. 
[2]  “Questionnaire with participation of 3 TSO’s”, KEMA. 
[3] “Betrouwbaarheid @ Vision”, Phase to Phase April 2001, document 01-119 pmo 
[4] “Incorporation reliability calculations in routine network planning: theory and practice”, paper 
0025 18th International conference on electricity distribution by J.G. Slootweg (Essent Netwerk 
B.V.) and P.M. van Oirsouw (Phase to Phase) 
[5]    “Advies van de Energieraad over aansprakelijkheid bij leveringsonderbrekingen”, Algemene 
Energieraad, October 2003. 
[6] “Rapport voor Algemene Energieraad: Achtergronden bij aansprakelijkheid bij onderbrekingen 
van elektriciteitsvoorzieningen”, Kema Consulting April 2003, summary pp iii-v 
[7]  “Gansch het raderwerk staat stil – De kosten van stroomstoringen”, SEO 2003, report no 
685, ISBN 90-6733-243-7, pages iii-iv 
[8] “Analysis techniques for system reliability-Procedure for failure mode effects analysis”, IEC 
812 premiere edition 1985 
[9]  “Adjustment techniques for electromechanical relays GEK99350, General electric 
http://www.geindustrial.com/products/support/emrelays/gek99350.pdf 
[10]  “ABB descriptive bulletin 41-101E”,  ABB 
http://library.abb.com/GLOBAL/SCOT/scot229.NSF/VerityDisplay/7A0FC5352A412E69C1256E7
800548916/$File/DB41_101e_CO.pdf 
and  
http://www.abb.com/global/abbzh/abbzh251.nsf!OpenDatabase&db=/global/seitp/seitp328.ns
f&v=9AAC720001&e=us&c=95301E2F0C12B5CBC1256E7E003223E5 
   50 
List of abbreviations 
 
 e.m. : electromechanical 
 FMEA : failure mode effects analysis 
 FMECA : failure mode effect and criticality analysis 
RPN : Risk Priority Number 
TSO : Transmission system operator 
LNO : Local network operator 
 
 List of definitions 
 
Outage  network interruption resulting in disconnection of customers 
 
Impact of an outage  the way in which an interruption affects customers 
 
Cascaded outage  interruption which affects a larger area (group of customers) than 
only the intended protected area 
 
Risk Priority Number ranking that combines scores  
  
PARETO analysis technique for arranging scores by the weight of scores 
 
PARETO rule rule that states that 80 percent of the failures is caused by 20 percent 
of the components 
  
Failure mode  the effect by which a failure is observed in a system component 
  
Failure effect  the way a failure affects the operation of a system 
 
Status condition parameter that indicates the state of operation of the relay. 
Condition indicator indicator, which describes the maintenance efforts, put into the 
component to result in operational status. 
Maintenance effort actions required for status verification and keeping the component in 
service. 
Test report  report  wherein test results and maintenance activities are 
documented 
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Appendix 
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A1   Explanation of common protective relaying principles 
 
The following passage gives a brief explanation of the following protective relaying schemes in 
Dutch medium voltage grids: 
• over current protection,  
• differential protection 
• distance (zone) protection 
 
The figures and descriptions are taken from the following documents: 
• “Electrical engineering handbook” by Wai Kai Chen, chapter 9 
• “Art and Science of protective relaying” by R. Mason 
 
Over current protection  
The following picture shows a radial feeder consisting of three sections. 
 
Figure 1. Radial feeder 
 
Each circuit breaker B is tripped by a protective relay which operates according to the inverse 
time curve as shown below: 
 
 
Figure 2. Inverse time curves 
 
Here three circuit breakers are tripped on 5A fault current. The curves show that the three circuit 
breakers trip on different moments. The example here gives an operating time of 0.2 and 0.7. 
One circuit breaker will trip on a later instance. In this way backup protection is realized. Here 
circuit breaker B12 is the backup for B23 and 34. And circuit breaker B23 is the backup of B34.  
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Differential protection 
(Current) Differential protection consist of an over current type relay and two interconnected 
current transformers. The protected element here is a portion of a bus.  
  
 
Figure 3. basic setup current differential 
The differential protection only protects the bus portion between the current transformers. A fault 
in an adjacent section will not cause this setup to trip the circuit breaker. The currents flowing 
through the current transformers circulate but do not flow through the relay. 
 
 
Figure 4. External fault 
  
A fault in the protected section, an internal fault, will cause the differential relay to trip the circuit 
breaker. 
 
Figure 5. External fault 
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Distance (impedance) protection 
This protective relay is operates on the voltage-current ratio or impedance principle. Impedance 
is an electrical measure of transmission line or bus. The operation characteristic is shown below.  
 
 
Figure 6. operation characteristic impedance relay 
 
The impedance relay is a balanced unit. A change in voltage or in current causes the impedance 
to change thus changing the balance. The figure below shows what happens when the balance is 
disturbed: 
  
Figure 6. operation time versus impedance characteristic 
 
A change in impedance is related to a time to trip. The protective relay operates instantly at short 
circuit situations and time delayed in case of an overload. 
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A2   FMECA sheet and input sheets (Detection, Severity) 
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Detection input sheets 
failure detection time setting & calibration                
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Failure detection U magnet         
 U-magnet             
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Failure detection actuation     
 Drag magnet   
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Failure detection tripping                  
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Absolute uncertainty  5                
Remote  4                
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High  2                
Certain  1                
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Severity input sheets 
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catastrophic 5                               5 5 
critical       4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4     4 4 4     
moderate   3 3                 3             
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minor                         1           
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catastrophic  5                 
critical  4                 
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marginal  2                 
minor  1                 
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Severity detection        
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 Drag magnet   
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A3  Results of the FMECA procedure 
 
List of components, failures and detection provisions 
 
Table 17. component failures in time setting & calibration 
Time setting & Calibration         
   Failure   Detection provision 
        
Bronze leaf spring   Broken spring  
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
   Wrongly set  
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
   Bent   
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
        
Clamping screws   Loose   
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
        
Upper pivot   Loose   
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
   Damaged  
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
   Stuck   
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
        
Upper pivot adjusting screw Loose   
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
        
Jewel Screw   Wrongly set  
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
   Damaged  
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
   Stuck   
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
        
Jewel screw set screw   Loose   
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
   Stuck   
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
   Damaged  
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
        
Time dial lock screw   Broken   
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
   Loose   
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
        
Spring/ wave washer   Broken   
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
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   Stuck   
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
            
 
Table 18. Components and failures in detection 
Detection           
   Failure   Detection provision 
        
Coil (upper pole)   short circuit  Circuitry measurement 
   Loose   Circuitry measurement 
   Broken   Circuitry measurement 
        
Taps   Loose   
Visual inspection, 
tightening screws / 
pulling wire connections 
   No detection  
Visual inspection, 
tightening screws / 
pulling wire connections 
        
Coil (lower pole)   Loose   Circuitry measurement 
   Broken   Circuitry measurement 
   Short circuit  Circuitry measurement 
            
 
Table 19. Components and failures in actuation 
Actuation           
   Failure   Detection provision 
        
Locking nut   Loose   
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
   Stuck   
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
        
Magnet   Decreased magnetic strength  
   Damaged/broken  
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
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Table 20. components and failures in tripping 
Tripping           
   Failure   Detection provision 
        
(seal in unit) Coil (tapped) Short circuit  Circuitry measurement 
   Broken   Circuitry measurement 
   Loose   Circuitry measurement 
        
(seal in unit) Armature   Stuck   Functional test 
        
(seal in unit) Taps   Loose   Circuitry measurement 
   No detection  Circuitry measurement 
        
    No electrical contact Circuitry measurement 
   Bad electrical contact Circuitry measurement 
        
        
Stationary contact 
adjusting screw   Loose    
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
   Damaged  
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
   Stuck   
Case open inspection / 
maintenance 
        
Upper stationary contact No electrical contact Circuitry measurement 
   Bad electrical contact Circuitry measurement 
        
Lower stationary contact No electrical contact Circuitry measurement 
   Bad electrical contact Circuitry measurement 
        
Moving contact   No electrical contact Circuitry measurement 
   Bad electrical contact Circuitry measurement 
            
 
    
 
RPN tables for calculation of RPNw 
  Induction disc relay GE IFC series Failure mode effects and criticality analysis             
             
  Subsystem System element Function Failure mode Detection Occurrence Severity RPN    
      D O S     
time setting & calibration Disc stop arm   facilitate stationary contact and end disc travel            
  1 bronze leaf spring 
prevent sticking of stop arm to 
time dial stop no actuation 4 2 5 40    
  2 bronze leaf spring  slow actuation 3 2 3 18    
  3 bronze leaf spring  no actuation 4 2 3 24    
  4 Clamping screws clamp arm and leaf spring no actuation 3 2 4 24    
              
time setting & calibration Disc centering & end play Alignment of disk in gap          
  5 Upper pivot set end play, max. upper position loose 4 1 4 16    
  6 Upper pivot  damaged 4 1 4 16    
  7 Upper pivot  stuck 4 1 4 16    
  8 
Upper pivot 
adjusting screw fixate upper pivot loose 4 1 4 16    
  9 Jewel screw support disk in gap 
poor disk in gap 
alignment 4 1 4 16    
  10 Jewel screw  damaged 3 1 4 12    
  11 Jewel screw  stuck 3 1 4 12    
  12 
Jewel screw set 
screw fixate jewel screw loose 3 1 3 9    
  13 
Jewel screw set 
screw  stuck 3 1 1 3    
  14 
Jewel screw set 
screw  damaged 3 1 4 12    
              
time setting & calibration Time dial  set time delay          
  15 
Time dial lock 
screws 
fix position time dial to prevent 
backtravel due to reversed torque broken 2 1 4 8    
  16 
Time dial lock 
screws  loose 2 1 4 8    
  17 Spring/wave washer 
A flat spring designed to provide a 
compression force eliminate take 
up tolerance and rattle broken 4 1 5 20 Sum RPNw 
  18 Spring/wave washer   stuck 4 1 4 16 286 13 
 
    
 
Detection U-magnet   create emf in coils    D O  S   RPN    
  19 Coil (upper pole) create/induce emf in disc short circuit 2 3 5 30    
  20 Coil (upper pole)  short circuit 2 3 5 30    
  21 Coil (upper pole)  loose 2 4 4 32    
  22 Coil (upper pole)  broken 2 4 5 40    
  23 Taps 
set magnitude of detection 
current no detection 3 2 5 30    
  24 Taps  loose 2 2 5 20    
  25 Coil(lower pole) create/induce emf in disc short circuit 2 3 5 30    
  26 Coil(lower pole)  short circuit 2 3 5 30    
  27 Coil(lower pole)  loose 2 3 5 30 Sum RPNw 
  28 Coil(lower pole)   broken 2 3 5 30 302 24 
             
             
Actuation 
Drag 
magnet   drag disc    D O  S   RPN    
  29 Locking nut adjust drag on disk loose 3 1 5 15    
  30 Locking nut  stuck 3 1 1 3    
  31 Magnet cause drag on disk 
decreased 
magnetic strength 5 1 0 0 Sum RPNw 
  32 Magnet   
damaged / 
broken 3 2 3 18 36 7 
 
    
 
Tripping Seal in unit   latch tripsignal    D O  S   RPN    
  33 (su) Coil (tapped) create emf short circuit 2 3 5 30    
  34 (su) Coil (tapped)  short circuit 2 3 5 30    
  35 (su) Coil (tapped)  broken 2 3 5 30    
  36 (su) Coil (tapped)  loose 2 2 5 20    
  37 (su) Armature actuate contact movement stuck 2 2 5 20    
  38 (su) Taps 
set magnitude of detection 
current no detection 2 2 5 20    
  39 (su) Taps  loose 2 2 5 20    
  40 (su) contacts close tripcircuit No electrical contact 2 3 5 30    
  41 (su) contacts  No electrical contact 2 3 5 30    
  42 (su) contacts  
bad electrical 
contact 2 3 4 24    
              
Tripping Stationary contact & zero timedial Support stationary contact and end travel of disc         
  43 
Upper stationary 
contact make electrical contact No electrical contact 2 3 5 30    
  44 
Upper stationary 
contact  No electrical contact 2 3 5 30    
  45 
Upper stationary 
contact  
bad electrical 
contact 2 3 4 24    
  46 
Stationary contact 
adjusting screw adjust contact position loose 3 1 3 9    
  47 Stationary contact adjusting screw damaged 3 1 4 12    
  48 Stationary contact adjusting screw stuck 3 1 1 3    
  49 Lower statonary contact make electrical contact No electrical contact 2 3 5 30    
  50 Lower statonary contact  No electrical contact 2 3 5 30    
  51 Lower statonary contact  
bad electrical 
contact 2 3 4 24    
  52 Moving contact make electrical contact No electrical contact 2 3 5 30    
  53 Moving contact  No electrical contact 2 3 5 30 Sum RPNw 
  54 Moving contact   
bad electrical 
contact 2 3 5 30 536 19 
 
    
Tables for calculation of Criticality 
Component numbers                   
sticking/no actuation 1 2 3 4                      
decreased magnetic strength 31                            
Loose 5 8 12 16 21 24 27 29 36 39 46        
Damaged/broken 6 10 14 15 17 22 28 32 35 47          
Stuck 7 11 13 18 30 37 48                
Poor disk aligment 9                            
Short circuit 19 20 25 26 33 34                  
No detection 23 38                          
bad electrical contact 42 45 51 54                      
No electrical contact 40 41 43 44 49 50 52 53              
occurrence of failure mode            Ofm   Ofm Sfm  Cfm 
sticking/no actuation 2 2 2 2               2,0  8 2 4 {1} 8 
decreased magnetic strength 1                     1,0  3 1 3 {2} 3 
Loose 1 1 1 1 4 2 3 1 2 2 1 1,7  7,707 2 4 {3} 8 
Damaged/broken 1 1 1 1 1 4 3 2 3 1   1,8  8,14 2 4 {4} 8 
Stuck 1 1 1 1 1 2 1         1,1  3,324 1 3 {5} 3 
Poor disk aligment 1                     1,0  4 1 4 {6} 4 
Short circuit 3 3 3 3 3 3           3,0  15 3 5 {7} 15 
No detection 2 2                   2,0  10 2 5 {8} 10 
bad electrical contact 3 3 3 3               3,0  12,94 3 4 {9} 13 
No electrical contact 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3       3,0  15 3 5 {10} 15 
    
 
severity of failure mode            Sfm       
sticking/no actuation 5 3 3 4               3,8       
decreased magnetic strength 3                     3,0       
Loose 4 4 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 3 4,3       
Damaged/broken 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 3 5 4   4,3       
Stuck 4 4 1 5 1 5 1         3,0       
Poor disk aligment 4                     4,0       
Short circuit 5 5 5 5 5 5           5,0       
No detection 5 5                   5,0       
bad electrical contact 4 4 4 5               4,3       
No electrical contact 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5       5,0       
    
A4  Input tables for observations and efforts 
 
 
Adjustment of time settings  Pickup function (only with induction types) 
Adjusted? Yes (1) / No 
(9) not adjusted 0  functional? Not conducted 0 
  Yes 1    functional 1 
  No 9    not functional 9 
Inputcircuit measurement    Seal-in function    
  
Not carried 
out 0  functional? Not conducted 0 
  Yes 1    functional 1 
  No 9    not functional 9 
Outputcircuit measurement    Indication (flag)    
  
not carried 
out 0    Not conducted 0 
  Yes 1    functional 1 
  No 9    not functional 9 
Wye point measurement    Trip circuit test    
  
not carried 
out 0    Not conducted 0 
  Yes 1    functional 1 
  No 9    not functional 9 
Tightening terminal screws    CB operates on trip yes (9) / no (1) 
  
not carried 
out 0    Not conducted 0 
  Yes 1    functional 1 
  No 9    not functional 9 
Cleaning contacts    Terminal check     
  
not carried 
out 0  CT disconnected not checked 0 
  necesarry 1    Yes 1 
  
not 
necesarry 9    No 9 
    Loose Lead(s)     
      not checked 0 
      Yes 1 
      No 9 
    Power supply disconnected   
      not checked 0 
      Yes 1 
      No 9 
    Contactfunction    
      not checked 0 
      bad 1 
      Good 9 
    Drop-out time meeting requirements 
      not checked 0 
      Yes 1 
      No 9 
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A5   Test report 
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Manufacturers test report 
Over current protection          
Test protocol         MS 810 P1/ 11,78       
Client: Raszig Gmbh, Pforzheim        
Installation: Papermill         
Installationsection/id nr.: Pulp sieve      Feeder : BA3  
Setting Ranges 2.5MVA-trafo, 6/0.4kV,Uk=6%, Jn=240/3620 A      
CT ratio 250/1A 5P10 Core 15 VA   Earthed side: R1  
Voltage at 6kV         
Type: GE IFC 51  group: -   Manufact. No: X8-10  
Mount type draw out      Aux. Voltage: 220 V, -Hz  
Settings J> L1, L2,L3   J> L1, L2,L3 Je t> t>>    
 1.8 to 3.6 A   6 to 20 A - to - A 0.1 to 8s 0.1 to 8s    
          
Pick up test conducted with:   Secondary testeqt SRP4 and timing unit  B2040    
          
  J> (A)     J>> (A)     Je t> (s) t>> (s) 
Settings 2.7A 2. 675A     8A 2. 2000A      -  2. -    A 1 s 0.5 s 
Phase L1 L2 L3 L1 L2 L3 L1, L2,L3 L1, L2,L3 L1, L2,L3 
Pick up 2.75 2.7 2.75 8.5 8.5 8.5 - 1 0.5 
Drop out 2.35 2.20 2.30 - - - - - - 
          
Check of clearance and signalling: Circuitbreaker 6 kV and 400V; over current 2,5 MVA-transformer    
Remarks: Complete documentation of Voltage protection was available      
          
i. A. Heinz (ZN-Stgt. MA)                             N. Redlich (E-Commisioning)        
Supplier  Commissioning engineer       
HEINZ  REDLICH        
Name  Name        
Location Pforzheim         
Date 3.5.78         
 (by courtesy of Siemens)
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